

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NASSAU 01223 01 OF 02 301916Z

42

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 OFA-01 COME-00 L-03 OES-03 SSO-00

NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 EB-07

TRSE-00 OMB-01 INT-05 DLOS-04 DOTE-00 JUSE-00 SCS-03

SCA-01 ARAE-00 /075 W

----- 005587

O 301742Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7003

INFO COMDT COGARD WASHDC IMMEDIATE

COGDSEVEN MIAMI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NASSAU 1223

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EFIS BF

SUBJ: SPINY LOBSTER: MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ADDERLEY

REF: STATE 178301

1. I DELIVERED THE NOTE CONTAINED IN REFTEL TOGETHER WITH THE VERBAL ASSURANCE TO MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ADDERLEY THIS MORNING. I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE GCOB WOULD FIND THE NOTE RESPONSIVE TO THE POINTS PREVIOUSLY RAISED IN THEIR NOTE TO US AS WELL AS IN THE VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS WHICH I HAVE HAD WITH THE MINISTER AND WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, AND ACCORDINGLY COULD AGREE TO THE DATE WHICH WE PROPOSED FOR COMMENCEMENT OF DEFINITIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. ADDERLEY IMMEDIATELY READ THROUGH THE NOTE IN MY PRESENCE (WHICH SOMEWHAT SURPRISED ME). HE STATED THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE QUESTION OF THE MORATORIUM ON WHICH HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE GOVERNMENT AT THIS TIME, "ON A QUICK READING" IT APPEARED AS IF THE NOTE DID RESPOND TO THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NASSAU 01223 01 OF 02 301916Z

ISSUES WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED.

3. SETTLING BACK IN HIS CHAIR, ADDERLEY SUGGESTED THAT WE DISCUSS INFORMALLY HOW BEST TO PROCEED. HE WENT ON TO ASK ME HOW RAPIDLY I THOUGHT THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE CONCLUDED. I SAID THAT THAT ALL DEPENDED UPON HOW LARGE AND DETAILED A NUMBER OF CONDITIONS THE BAHAMIAN GOVERNMENT HAD IN MIND. OBVIOUSLY, IF THESE COULD BE KEPT VERY LIMITED, FOR EXAMPLE, A FLAT FEE FOR "X" NUMBER OF LICENSES, THE PROBLEM WOULD BE MUCH SIMPLIFIED. HOWEVER, I SAID THAT IN ALL HONESTY, GIVEN SOME OF THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE TERMS OF THEIR LEGISLATION SUCH AS RECIPROCITY AND NATIONALITY AS WELL AS SOME OF THE OTHER ISSUES WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND BY HIM, IN MY OWN PERSONAL VIEW, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE A VERY SHORT NEGOTIATION. ADDERLEY SMILED AND SAID THAT WAS PRECISELY HIS OWN THINKING. I SAID THAT IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT I HAD SO STRONGLY URGED THAT FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO A MORATORIUM. IF WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT WE COULD CONDUCT A BRIEF, SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION, I THOUGHT WE COULD STAVE OFF THE PRESSURES GENERATED BY OUR FISHING INTERESTS AND AVOID ANY UNTOWARD INCIDENTS. THE LONGER THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDED AND THE FISHERMEN WERE PROHIBITED FROM PURSUING THEIR LIVELIHOOD, THE MORE DIFFICULT THE PROBLEM BECAME.

4. ADDERLEY ASKED ME WHETHER, BASED ON MY MEETING OF LAST FRIDAY, I HAD ANY IDEA HOW MANY OF THE TRAPS HAD BEEN REMOVED BY THE FISHERMEN. I SAID I COULD NOT ANSWER THAT QUESTION IN ANY DETAIL BUT THAT MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT A VERY LARGE NUMBER HAD BEEN REMOVED. I WENT ON TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE INDUSTRY WITH WHOM I HAD MET LAST WEEK STRUCK ME AS EXTREMELY RESPONSIBLE AND GENUINELY DESIROUS OF SEEING AN EQUITABLE GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT WORKED OUT. I DID NOTE THAT THERE WERE A SMALL GROUP OF PICKETERS WHO MIGHT BE PRESUMED TO REPRESENT LESS RESPONSIBLE FISHERMEN AND I DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY TRAPS THIS GROUP MIGHT STILL HAVE OUT. I WENT ON TO SAY, IN THE PRECEDING CONNECTION, THAT THOUGH I HAD NOT INTENDED TO RAISE THE MATTER, SINCE THE MINISTER HAD INQUIRED ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NASSAU 01223 01 OF 02 301916Z

FISHERMEN AND THEIR ACTIONS THAT I SHOULD TELL HIM THAT I HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT ONE OF THE MARITIME UNIONS WAS ACTIVELY ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE THE FISHERMEN. AS A PART OF THIS EFFORT, WORD HAD REACHED ME THAT THERE WAS DISCUSSION OF PICKETING THE CRUISE SHIPS AND ATTEMPTING TO FORECLOSE THEIR COMING TO THE BAHAMAS. IT WAS THIS SORT OF INCIDENT THAT I HAD IN MIND, WHICH WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT HELP THE ATMOSPHERE AND WHICH I HOPED COULD

BE AVOIDED BY A MORATORIUM.

5. ADDERLEY RESPONDED RATHER MILDLY (MORE ON HIS ATTITUDE BELOW) BY SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT SURPRISED. THE UNION HAD ATTEMPTED TO ORGANIZE THE FISHERMEN BEFORE AND, MOREOVER, THEY, IN THE PAST, HAD EXPERIENCES WITH PICKETING OF CRUISE SHIPS. HE SAID "THE LAST TIME IT LASTED FOR A FEW WEEKS AND MAYBE WE LOST 10,000 TOURISTS. THAT DOESN'T BOTHER US AND, IN FACT, IT GIVES US PUBLICITY." I RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT I HOPED THE THREATENED PICKETING WOULD NOT MATERIALIZE BUT IF IT DID AND THE MINISTER CALLED ME IN I WOULD REMIND HIM OF HIS REACTION. HE LAUGHED.

6. ADDERLEY THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT, STILL SPEAKING QUITE INFORMALLY, HE GENUINELY FELT THAT THE NEGOTIATION WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY FACILITATED IF HE HAD AN ADVANCE INDICATION OF THE SORTS OF PROPOSALS WE INTEND TO PRESENT. HE WAS NOT PROPOSING A DETAILED PRESENTATION. RATHER HE SAID THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF HAVING AN INSIGHT IN ADVANCE INTO THE ISSUES WE INTENDED TO RAISE, TO AGREE TO A DATE FOR THE DEFINITIVE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ONLY BE TO WASTE THE TIME OF OUR EXPERTS FROM WASHINGTON. HE SAID THAT UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES ALL HE WOULD BE ABLE TO DO WOULD BE TO LISTEN TO OUR PROPOSALS AND THEN IN EFFECT ADJOURN THE MEETING SO THAT THEY COULD BE STUDIED AND DISCUSSED WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF HE HAD SOME IDEA OF WHAT WE WERE GOING TO PROPOSE, THEY COULD BEGIN TO DO SOME OF THEIR OWN HOMEWORK AND THE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE MORE FRUITFUL.

7. I TOLD ADDERLEY THAT WHILE I UNDERSTOOD HIS POINT, I THOUGHT IT IGNORED TWO CONSIDERATIONS: FIRST, OUR OWN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NASSAU 01223 01 OF 02 301916Z

POSITION MIGHT VERY WELL EVOLVE AND IN SOME MEASURE BE DEPENDENT UPON CLARIFICATIONS AND DISCUSSION OF WHAT THE BAHAMIANS HAD IN MIND, SECONDLY, I FEARED THAT THIS SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF STILL FURTHER DELAY IN SETTING A DATE WHICH, IN THE ABSENCE OF A MORATORIUM, PRESENTED CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS. ADDERLEY RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT IT NEED NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVE DELAY AND AS HE SAW IT SHOULD EXPEDITE THE PROCESS: "IF YOU COULD GIVE ME A LIST TOMORROW OF THE SORTS OF ISSUES YOU PROPOSED TO RAISE, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO RESPOND AT ONCE TO A DATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS NEXT WEEK."

8. I ASKED ADDERLEY WHAT SORTS OF ISSUES HE HAD IN MIND. HIS RESPONSE INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

(A) IF THERE IS TO BE LICENSING, HOW LARGE
A NUMBER OF LICENSES IS THE U.S. THINKING OF?

(B) HOW MANY TRAPS PER BOAT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?

(C) OVER WHAT DURATION OF TIME WOULD THE AGREEMENT
EXTEND?

(D) WHAT AREAS ARE WE CONSIDERING TO BE UTILIZED
BY THE FISHERMEN, ETC.?

HE SAID HE WANTED EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS NOT THINKING OF
A DETAILED EXPOSITION ON SUCH POINTS AS THESE. RATHER,
BY WAY OF EXAMPLE, HE SAID THAT IF THE U.S. WAS THINKING
OF A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF LICENSES, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NASSAU 01223 02 OF 02 302054Z

65

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 OFA-01 COME-00 L-03 OES-03 SSO-00

NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 EB-07

TRSE-00 OMB-01 INT-05 DLOS-04 DOTE-00 JUSE-00 SCS-03

SCA-01 /075 W

----- 006955

O 301742Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7004

INFO COMDT COGARD WASHDC IMMEDIATE

COGDSEVEN MIAMI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 NASSAU 1223

HAVE TO REFLECT UPON WHETHER THAT NUMBER OR SOME OTHER
SEEMED REALISTIC. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE NEGOTIATIONS
OPENED BY OUR SIMPLY STATING A NUMBER, AS HE HAD STATED EARLIER,
THEY WOULD THEN HAVE TO SIT AND LISTEN AND THEN ADJOURN FOR
THE PURPOSE OF BEGINNING TO FORMULATE THEIR OWN THOUGHTS ON

THE MATTER. I ASKED HIM TO CLARIFY WHAT HE HAD IN MIND BY REFERENCE TO THE AREAS TO BE UTILIZED. IN RESPONSE, IT APPEARED THAT HE HAD IN MIND THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT. HE STATED THAT IF RATHER SPECIFIC AREAS COULD BE IDENTIFIED, IN PARTICULAR ONES WHICH HAD EXPLICIT LAND MARKS THIS WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE FISHERMEN TO UNDERSTAND WHERE THEY COULD AND COULD NOT FISH, WOULD REDUCE AMBIGUITIES FOR CASES WHICH REACHED THE COURTS AND WOULD FACILITATE MONITORING BY THE LIMITED BAHAMIAN PATROL BOAT CAPABILITIES.

9. I TOLD ADDERLEY THAT I WOULD OF COURSE TRANSMIT HIS PROPOSAL AT ONCE. HOWEVER, I ASKED HIM TO BE EXPLICIT ON ONE POINT, NAMELY, WAS HE SAYING THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE WE COULD OBTAIN AN ANSWER TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR BEGINNING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON AUGUST 5 UNTIL HE HAD RECEIVED WHAT HE HAD DESCRIBED AS "SOME CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NASSAU 01223 02 OF 02 302054Z

IDEA OF WHAT WE INTENDED TO PROPOSE." HIS RESPONSE WAS IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, BUT IMMEDIATELY POINTED OUT AGAIN THAT THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE TALKS COULD NOT BEGIN NEXT WEEK IF WE COULD GET THAT INFORMATION TO HIM QUICKLY. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT ASSURE HIM THAT THIS WAS POSSIBLE BUT THAT I WOULD PROMPTLY ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN WASHINGTON VIEWS.

10. COMMENT: (A) THE FIRST POINT WORTH NOTING IS THAT ADDERLEY'S OWN ATTITUDE IN THIS DISCUSSION WAS FAR MORE RELAXED AND AMICABLE THAN IN MY LAST MEETING WITH HIM. IN PART, THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN AS A RESULT OF SATISFACTION WITH OUR NOTE BUT THE FEELING SEEMED TO BE PROJECTED EVEN BEFORE HE READ THROUGH OUR NOTE. IN ADDITION, HOWEVER, IT IS CERTAINLY POSSIBLE THAT OTHER PRESSURES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO BEAR ON ADDERLEY WHICH HAVE TEMPERED HIS ATTITUDE OR AT LEAST HIS JUDGMENT AS TO HOW FAR HE CAN PRESS. I, MYSELF, HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO TALK TO VARIOUS PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY TO GET OUR POINT OF VIEW ACROSS. FOR EXAMPLE, SATURDAY EVENING, I TALKED WITH SENATOR MORRIS WHO OF COURSE IS A COLLEAGUE IN THE SENATE WITH ADDERLEY. MORRIS IS A BANKER WHO WAS IN FLORIDA (IN FACT OUR DISCUSSION BEGAN IN THE AIRPORT IN MIAMI) AND WHO INDICATED HE HAD BEEN TALKING WITH VARIOUS FISHING INTERESTS IN THE MIAMI AREA. MORRIS RESPONDED VERY POSITIVELY TO MY ARGUMENTS THAT THE U.S. AS WELL AS THE FLORIDA FISHERMEN WERE PREPARED TO BE REASONABLE IN RESPONDING TO THE BAHAMIAN LAW AND THAT THERE WERE CONSIDERABLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR FINANCIAL BENEFITS TO THE BAHAMAS IF WE COULD WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION, MORRIS VOLUNTEERED THAT "PAUL ADDERLEY CAN BE A VERY STUBBORN MAN" AND BY THE END OF THE DISCUSSION STATED THAT HE WOULD TALK TO ADDERLEY TO SEE IF HE COULD NOT GET HIM TO BE MORE SYMPATHETIC. I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING HOW MUCH INFLUENCE MORRIS HAS WITH ADDERLEY. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE IS ONE OF A SMALL GROUP OF BAHAMIAN OFFICIALS WHO MEET

DAILY AT 6:00 AM WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON ONE OF THE LOCAL BEACHES FOR A HALF HOUR OF SWIMMING AND EXERCISE. IT SEEMS NOT UNREASONABLE TO SPECULATE THAT THIS "IN GROUP" POSSIBLY DISCUSSES MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST AND THE LOBSTER ISSUE IS FRONT PAGE NEWS DOWN HERE THESE DAYS. IN SHORT, I HAD THE IMPRESSION, BUT ONE WHICH I CANNOT DOCUMENT, THAT ADDERLEY MAY WELL BE FEELING SOME CONSTRAINTS ON HIS OWN PERSONAL PREDISPOSITIONS. EVEN HIS MORE MODERATE RESPONSE TO THE PRO-CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NASSAU 01223 02 OF 02 302054Z

POSED MORATORIUM (THOUGH I THINK HE WILL PERSONALLY STILL OPPOSE IT) TENDS TO SUPPORT THIS SPECULATION.

(B) WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT THE BAHAMIANS WOULD LOOK TO US TO ADVANCE PROPOSALS. MOREOVER, WE HAVE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT THEY FEEL LIMITED IN THEIR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM IN ANY DETAIL. THIS IS FURTHER BORNE OUT BY TODAY'S CONVERSATIONS. THERE HAS BEEN ALL SORTS OF EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE NOT THOUGHT THIS ISSUE THROUGH. EVEN IN TODAY'S CONVERSATION, ADDERLEY, SPECULATING ALOUD, WONDERED WHO WOULD DETERMINE WHICH FISHERMEN WERE TO BE LICENSED IF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF LICENSES WERE LESS THAN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS AND FURTHER, ON WHAT BASIS THIS MIGHT BE DONE. (INCIDENTALLY, WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. MIGHT UNDERTAKE TO DO THIS PERHAPS BASED ON SOME AGREED STANDARDS, E.G. THE VALUE OF THEIR PAST CATCH, ADDERLEY DID NOT REACT NEGATIVELY.) I THINK WE ARE NOW, THEREFORE, FACED WITH THE NECESSITY FOR ADVANCING AT LEAST IN SOME ABBREVIATED FORM, OUR PROPOSALS WITH REGARD TO THE SORTS OF ISSUES RAISED BY ADDERLEY IN PARA 9 ABOVE, AS WELL AS OTHERS WHICH WE MAY DETERMINE TO BE PERTINENT.

(C) THERE IS NO REASON WHY WE CANNOT SEIZE THIS PROPOSAL OF ADDERLEY'S AS AN OPPORTUNITY. WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS, WE CAN ADVANCE AS MUCH OR AS LITTLE AS WE WISH AND I TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT WE WOULD ADVANCE A NEGOTIATING POSITION WHICH WOULD ASK FOR MORE THAN WE ARE PREPARED TO EVENTUALLY ACCEPT. I WOULD HOPE IN THIS REGARD, HOWEVER, THAT IN ADVANCING PROPOSALS WE ARE ABLE TO TIE THEM TO SOME LOGICAL PREMISES. FOR EXAMPLE, I THINK WE SHOULD SUGGEST LICENSING AGREEMENT OF 5-YEAR DURATION, TO BE RENEGOTIATED IN FIRST HALF OF 5TH YEAR. WE SHOULD PROPOSE THAT SUCH LICENSING WOULD BE ADMINISTERED BY U.S. AUTHORITIES IN BEHALF OF GCOB IN ACCORDANCE WITH TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. AS FOR THOSE TERMS, WE SHOULD PROPOSE A FEE FOR LICENSES BASED UPON EITHER SIZE OF BOAT OR NUMBER OF TRAPS. WE SHOULD PROPOSE A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF LICENSES WHICH COULD BE BASED UPON THE TOTAL PREVIOUSLY LICENSED BY THE STATE OF FLORIDA OR UNDER U.S. REGISTRY OVER THE PAST YEAR OR TWO (PERHAPS PLUS A SMALL ADD-ON). OBVIOUSLY, WE SHOULD EXPECT THAT THE BAHAMIANS WILL NEGOTIATE DOWNWARD ON ALL POINTS, BUT IN ADVANCING A NEGOTIATING POSITION, WE SHOULD

HAVE A LOGICAL BASIS FOR OUR PROPOSAL SO AS NOT TO DISCREDIT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NASSAU 01223 02 OF 02 302054Z

OUR POSITION. ADDERLEY DOES NOT EXPECT AND WE WOULD PRESUMABLY WISH TO AVOID GOING INTO ANY MORE DETAIL THAN NECESSARY. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE WE MIGHT WISH TO SAY SOMETHING ON THE QUESTION OF COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT, INDICATING THAT IN PRINCIPLE WE ARE PREPARED TO HAVE THE COAST GUARD ASSIST, WE WOULD WANT TO QUALIFY THE WILLINGNESS BY STATING THAT SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT CONSISTENT WITH OUR LEGAL AUTHORITY AND CAPABILITIES. WE WILL ALSO WANT TO INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO INCORPORATE BAHAMIAN CONSERVATION REGULATIONS INTO AGREEMENT. FINALLY, WE WOULD OFFER TO INCORPORATE EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF BAHAMIAN JURISDICTION AS PART OF AGREEMENT.

11. IF DEPARTMENT IS ABLE TO PROVIDE SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED IMMEDIATELY ABOVE, I THINK WE CAN GET THE NEGOTIATIONS GOING NEXT WEEK. I WOULD URGE THAT WE ERR ON THE SIDE OF SIMPLICITY IN WHAT WE ADVANCE SO AS TO AVOID EXTENSIVE INTERNAL USG DISCUSSION ON DETAILS. I WOULD SETTLE FOR ADVANCING FEWER ITEMS IN LESSER DETAIL RATHER THAN RISK DELAY IN GETTING SOMETHING BACK TO GCOB. AS LONG AS WHAT WE ADVANCE IS BROAD ENOUGH TO GIVE US ROOM TO NEGOTIATE A FINAL ACCEPTABLE POSITION, THAT SHOULD MEET OUR NEEDS AND HOPEFULLY WILL MEET GCOB REQUIREMENT.

12. FINALLY, I HAVE A CALL IN TO THE PRIME MINISTER. IN ADDITION TO GIVING HIM THE VERBAL ASSURANCE CONTAINED IN REFTTEL, I WANT TO URGE UPON HIM AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF A MORATORIUM. UNFORTUNATELY, PM IS ON THE FLOOR OF THE PARLIAMENT TODAY AND MAY BE THERE THROUGH PART OF TOMORROW.
WEISS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SHELLFISH, DIPLOMATIC NOTES, NEGOTIATIONS, FISHING AGREEMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 30 JUL 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NASSAU01223
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750263-0309
From: NASSAU
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t1975078/aaaaahfy.tel
Line Count: 367
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 STATE 178301
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 SEP 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 SEP 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <08 DEC 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SPINY LOBSTER: MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ADDERLEY
TAGS: EFIS, PFOR, BF, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006